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Abstract
The Egyptian media displayed a high level of content diversity in the final years of the
Mubarak regime, prior to the 2011 uprising. This diversity expanded considerably after
the uprising when national media embodied expressions of dissent with unprecedented
openness, in defiance of the entrenched identity of the journalist as the regime’s guard.
This article investigates the dynamics of journalistic agency in Egyptian newsrooms in
search for a new identity, investigating the challenges, hopes and trade-offs of a painful
process of change. It looks at the complex interplay between these agentic dynamics
and inherited structures within an uncertain and highly contested transition to democ-
racy, which finally collapsed into a new chapter of authoritarianism. The article argues
that while journalistic agency helped support trends towards democratization in media
and politics in the immediate aftermath of the uprising, it also acted as powerful
platform in ‘othering’ opponents preparing the ground for the return of autocratic
practices and ultimately the fall of the democratic experiment.
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Introduction
The use of national media as a platform to denigrate dissent is a deeply rooted
practice in Egypt. The nationalization of the press by President Gamal Abdel
Nasser in 1956 transformed the national media into a platform at the service of
the regime, enforced through various legal and administrative instruments.
The state-owned national press – called as-Sahafa al-Qawmiyya – plays a crucial
role in ensuring the media disseminates a unified voice in support of the regime by
excluding and demonising dissent (el Issawi, 2014; Rizk and Atallah, 2011).
The immediate phase following the January 2011 uprising witnessed a trend
within the community of traditional journalists chaotically searching for a new
identity as they stepped away from their role as the regime’s mouthpiece.
This quest was empowered by the growing influence of social media as a news
source for traditional newsrooms and the adoption by many traditional journalists
of the blogger’s personalized style, a trend which was obvious in several North
African countries going through transitions or political reforms (Zayani, 2015).
[AQ1] The hybrid identity of the journalist–activist that began to emerge contrib-
uted to a debate on the need for change in newsrooms’ practices without leading to
a formal review of professional practices. These chaotic ‘revolts’ against the direct
or indirect political dictate were short lived, as they vanished with the military
coup of July 2013, when journalists embraced their old habits of obedience
to power.
The on-going clampdown on civil liberties in Egypt makes any attempt to
change unlikely to succeed. According to civil society groups, as many as 40,000
people are being detained for political reasons as of 2016 (Freedom House, 2017).
An alarming number of enforced disappearances by security forces continue to
rise. According to a report by Amnesty International released in 2016, at
least several hundred people, some as young as 14 years old, were abducted and
tortured by security agents (Ismail, 2016). The media is facing an unparalleled
crackdown: one example is the initiative of the government to provide citizens
with telephone hotlines for reporting so-called ‘false news’, ahead of the latest
presidential elections of March 2018, amid incitement against critical voices by
framing criticism of the military as ‘high treason’ (Reporters Without Borders,
2018). The country’s parliament has recently approved controversial constitutional
amendments that would allow Sisi to stay in power until 2030, if endorsed by a
popular referendum, while also granting the military extended powers over the
judiciary and politics (BBC, 2019). At least 496 websites were blocked between
May 2017 and February 2018, as per a report by an Egyptian NGO, the Freedom
of Thought and Expression Law Firm (Al Jazeera, 2018). Egypt is the world’s
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third largest jailer of journalists, with at least 20 behind bars (Committee to Protect
Journalists, 2018).
Egypt’s news media: Structures of control
Egyptian state media present a redundant and dysfunctional apparatus, with
numerous print houses and a giant broadcast service, all managed by a heavy
bureaucracy strongly linked to the executive power. The state-owned broadcaster
(the Egyptian Radio and Television Union), the body of staff of which is estimated
at no less than 40,000 persons, includes 30 TV stations and nine radio networks,
and is headed by the Minister of Information who directly oversees the manage-
ment of the institution and appoints its high officials (ERTU Law, 1979). [AQ2]
Privately owned media was reintroduced first with the partisan press owned by
political parties, and later through the outbreak of the so-called independent press
in 2003 (privately owned by legal persons) and the launch of private satellite TV
ventures in the same decade (Allam, 2012). The aftermath of the 2011 uprising
witnessed the flourishing of a panoply of privately owned media projects, especially
in the broadcast sector, without adopting a consistent regulatory framework for
licensing. The sector was open to all political players, including the Islamists,
without departing from the model of the media owners, the business tycoons
connected to the regime by common interests. Recently, local media reported on
new large media investments owned directly by the intelligence services. The com-
pany ‘Eagle Capital’ recently acquired a controlling stake in the prominent media
house ‘Egyptian Media Group’, which owns several media companies in Egypt.
According to an investigation by Mada Masr, one of few remaining independent
media platforms in the country, ‘Eagle Capital’, headed by former Investment
Minister Dalia Khorshid, is a private equity fund owned by the General
Intelligence Service (Bahgat, 2018).
The Egyptian parliament has recently approved a new media law and three
regulatory bodies reinforcing state control over traditional media and cyber
space through new prohibitions on content aimed at silencing dissent or alternative
media narratives (El-Sadany, 2018). The new law gives the regulatory bodies,
strongly linked to the government, a broad prerogative in blocking content and
websites, and open the door for the pursuit of journalists upon vaguely worded
legal stipulations, such as disregard of national security and the defence of the
country or incitement against the law (Amnesty International, 2018).
Methodology and structure
The article investigates the following research questions: how did journalists review
or attempt to review their professional practices amid the chaotic opening of the
political arena in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 uprising? How did these
dynamics impact the journalistic agency as an important player in helping or in
impeding the democratic change? How did these short-lived ‘revolts’ in newsrooms
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impact the entrenched identity of the regime’s guard among journalists in state and
private media and to what extent has this lead to radical and sustained change in
practices among journalists or, at the contrary, encouraged the return to
entrenched habits of obedience to politics?
The article draws on a series of 50 interviews conducted with Egyptian journal-
ists working in the news media in the years that followed the 2011 uprising until the
immediate phase after the military coup of July 2013. It is based on a thematic
analysis of in-depth interviews that focused on the personal professional itinerary
of each journalist and how they relate to their institutions, their professional
practices and the political sphere. The interviews were semi-guided, as they fol-
lowed a set of questions but left the window open for personal contributions from
the interviewees to reflect on their career paths. These interviews are mostly face to
face (some were conducted over the phone after the military coup when fieldwork
in Egypt became difficult). The sample of journalists chosen reflects a balanced
representation of the media industry, public and private, spanning radio, television
and print. While one specific case study looks at the agentic power of journalists in
state media in resisting alleged political dictate under the Brotherhood, other
examples cover the experiences of journalists in the influential private media
sector. The choice of journalists took also into consideration a balanced represen-
tation of male and female, senior and junior journalists.
The examples/case studies tackled in this article cover three important phases of
the post-uprising in Egypt: the rule of the period of the Supreme Council of Armed
Forces (SCAF) which witnessed important forms of rebellion against entrenched
traditions of censorship in reporting on the army, the one-year Brotherhood pres-
idency in which the issue of state media’s independence was one of most important
slogans in the opposition against their rule and finally the military coup of 2013
and its immediate aftermath when journalists embodied again old practices of
obedience in the name of national interests and the fight against terrorism.
While the second case looks at state media journalists’ agency in challenging
alleged control by the Brotherhood, as a form of journalistic but also political
opposition, the third case focuses on the role played by privately owned media in
fierce polarization during this exceptional parenthesis of openness and immediately
after its fall with the military takeover in 2013.
Before delving into these case studies, I will first critically unpack the multiple
and often ambivalent meanings and dynamics of agency as well as forms of polit-
ical and business parallelism between media and politics with references to inter-
national case studies.
The ambivalent journalistic agency
Media’s influence as an agent of change in a transitional process depends, to a
large extent, on the complex dynamics between the structural preconditions of
inherited systems on the one hand and the actors’ agency for creating change on
the other (Voltmer, 2013: 56). The intricate competition between structures and
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agency, as well as the constraints of the political transition, explain the ambiva-
lence in journalists’ perception of their roles in times of change, supporting reforms
while also serving as a tool in the hands of powerful actors. While the media
transformation is in itself one of the thorniest processes of institutional change,
it is difficult to expect a successful transition to democracy without professional
media that can hold the new elites to account.
Human agency has been defined according to various dimensions, mainly in
terms of routine, intentionality and judgement. Major theories in understanding
agency, such as the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, have given
importance to the role of routinized practices. However, this intentional activity at
the micro level cannot be understood independently from a system of interdepen-
dencies at the macro level, hence the complexity of its nature (Coleman, 1990).
Normative approaches attempted to categorize the journalistic practice into pro-
fessional models favouring an analysis based on structures. In their seminal work
on comparative communication studies, Four Theories of the Press, Siebert et al.
(1956) draw on four ‘ideals’ – typical models of journalism: authoritarian, liber-
tarian, social responsibility and soviet communist. According to this normative
categorization, the authoritarian model perceives the press as a tool for social
stability whereby limiting pluralism is necessary to promote a unifying national
narrative. This is in opposition with the liberal paradigm where media is expected
to act as a provider of information and a forum for debate of ideas, enabling
citizens to make their political choice freely (Curran, 2002). This categorization
is criticized for its universalist and Western-centric focus, and its lack of empirical
foundations. It is also perceived by scholars as failing to capture the complexities
of the interplay between structures and agency in a fluid environment, such as the
case of unpredictable processes of institutional change.
The wave of change that shook media and political structures after the 2011
uprising in Egypt witnessed the rise of an active agency among journalists in
defence of journalistic rights and independence from governmental control.
Like similar experiences affecting media in a regime change in Eastern Europe
(see Milton, 2001; Price et al., 2002), this agency took the form of an extremely
adversarial style, a specific genre of watchdog journalism based on the expression
of individual subjectivity and critical views.
Interviews conducted with journalists in this case study confirm the value they
give to the interventionist role they practiced amid the upheavals of an extremely
troubled political change, largely perceiving themselves as informers of the public
opinion rather than storytellers. While these journalists recognize the notion of a
‘watchdog’ function as an ideal of how professional journalism should be, they
reject neutral watchdog journalism as incompatible with the specific contexts and
structures in which their practices are taking place. The media’s role as a platform
for political messaging for ideological purposes becomes primordial during crucial
crises when the notion of objectivity is challenged by contextual limitations
(McQuail, 1992: 183–195).
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The journalistic ambivalence in the narratives of journalists interviewed, reject-
ing a Western approach to professional journalism while recognizing its impor-
tance, echoes Whitehead’s (2002) distinction between the ‘floating’ and ‘anchored’
aspects of professional norms and standards: those essential for media to function,
such as reporting a news story, and those that can be redefined or negotiated to fit
within specific contexts. [AQ3] However, this ambivalent journalistic agency has
equally ambivalent repercussions on the outcome of these fragile trajectories of
change: while it helps foster political engagement by increasing citizens’ knowledge
of current issues (Newton, 1999), militant journalism deepens societal and political
divides, making it difficult to reach a minimal agreement on the reality of the new
regime (Mouffe, 2005).
Media and political/business parallelism
The centrality of media’s role in politics has been the subject of much scholarly
research (Cottle, 2006; Curran, 2002; Graber, 2007; Sparrow, 1999). Entman
(1993) contends that through the functions of interpretation and framing, media
allows some aspects of the perceived reality to be grounded and others ignored;
arguing about a ‘cascading activation’ between media and politics (Entman, 2003),
in which media frames activate elite policy decisions and vice versa. The news
media’s role in shaping political reality is even more important in constructing
individuals’ perceptions of a conflict. The media have become a crucial factor in
transitional politics; mediatization of politics in emerging democracies is essential
to understanding the complex trajectories of these movements (Voltmer, 2013;
Wolfsfeld, 1997).
The limited research that was produced so far on the interplay between media
and politics in the context of the Arab uprisings demonstrates that traditional news
media acted as an active agent in destabilizing the new order by heavily dissemi-
nating a fear-mongering message, painting the transitions as an eminent danger
to the nation’s stability (el Issawi, 2016; Lynch, 2015). The concept of ‘conflict-
sensitive journalism’ was proposed as a possible solution to contain the effects of
such inevitable polarization, by training journalists to adopt a conscious attitude
about their responsibility to pacify conflicts without taking an advocacy role or
preaching solutions (Howard, 2015). A conflict-sensitive journalist is described as
one who ‘applies conflict analysis and searches for new voices and new ideas about
the conflict. . .takes no sides, but is engaged in the search for solutions’ (Howard,
2015: 15). However, there are doubts as to how deeply this model can be realisti-
cally embraced by journalists framing and communicating conflicts resulting from
the democratization processes in an environment of extremely heated polarization
such as this Egyptian case study.
Egyptian journalists’ account of their experiences and self-perception of prac-
tices discussed in this article reflect main features of political parallelism, a notion
developed by Colin Seymour-Ure (1974) and revisited by Hallin and Mancini
(2004, 2012) to describe a network of cosy relationships and complex alliances
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between media and political groups. This parallelism presented as the main feature
of the polarized model, the dominant media system in southern European coun-
tries, can be explained by the strong tradition of considering the mass media
as means of ideological and political mobilization (Bru¨ggemann et al., 2014).
Tumber (2007) argues that the media’s tendency to mirror politics, especially in
fractured societies, is the outcome of the lack of a clear identity for journalists as
an independent professional community rather than purely ideologically leaning.
In the same vein, the political context model proposed by Wolfsfeld (1997) con-
tends that politics has more sway over the media than the media has over politics,
thus the media’s dependency on the political agenda.
However, the parallelism between journalists and political camps in the experi-
ences of Egyptian journalists is not solely driven by ideological affinity but also by
business clientelism; journalists became powerful actors in a network of interests
whose logic is different from that of journalism. Their practices are impacted by a
system of patron–client relationships whereby the complex and changing alliances
between state bureaucracy and media owners largely define the media narratives
(Sparks, 2008). The changing dynamics of these alliances make this parallelism
inconsistent and ambiguous (Voltmer, 2013: 188). This model of parallelism
between the powers in place and media owners is explained by the fact that the
media barons use their investments in the field to pressure politicians in order to
consolidate their interests. In Greece, where media ownership is equally used as a
means to accumulate power, a traditional motto is ‘give me a ministry or I will
start a newspaper’ (Papathanassopoulos, 1999). This parallelism, absorbed by
journalists in their daily practices as the policy of the media institution, explains
the ease with which they swiftly move from one political camp to another to secure
the continuity of their media presence in tune with the nature of changes in the
political sphere. The example of Al-Ahram’s front page headline published the day
after Mubarak’s departure is instrumental. Having played a major role in deni-
grating protesters, describing them as thugs and traitors, Al-Ahram, a major state
newspaper, celebrated Mubarak’s departure by stating: ‘The people have toppled
the regime’ (Shenker, 2011).
While acknowledged as an expected feature of transitional societies, scholars of
democratization contend that excessive media–politics parallelism in tumultuous
transitions has negative implications for democratic change. Opening up the media
without a cultural change in the newsroom and without the establishment of inde-
pendent regulatory bodies can turn the media into a platform for parochial inter-
ests, including sectarian agendas and hate speech, thus leading to a deeply
polarized pluralism. It can also legitimize illiberal elites, allowing them to win
electoral processes and potentially re-impose autocratic practices (Voltmer, 2013:
190–192). Importantly, polarized pluralism hinders the creation of agonistic public
spaces in transitional contexts, in both political and media cultures. As Mouffe
contends (2005), the main role of a democracy should be to revert antagonistic
conflicts (whereby the ideological other is considered as an enemy that can be
legitimately destroyed) into agonistic conflicts (whereby the other is seen as an
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adversary with the legitimacy to exist, but also to disagree with). Opening media to
political allegiances, which can be rooted in sectarian and tribal bonds rather
than ideological affinities, makes the task of building a shared national identity
a difficult one.
However, this article does not in any way advocate for a depoliticized media
environment neither for an automated translation of Mouffe’ theory of agonistic
pluralism into the Egyptian context. The article takes into consideration the fact
that Mouffe’s analysis is rooted in Western democracies where the dynamics of
political and societal polarization take shape within established institutions and
non-violent contexts while the Egyptian polarization led to victory of the unre-
formed remnants of the previous authoritarian regime that seized power by imple-
menting a large-scale violent repression. The article uses Mouffe’s analysis as a
framework to understand some of the dynamics of political polarization intensified
by media practices while giving full consideration to the specific features of the
Egyptian context in the present and historically. It also takes into consideration
the critique of Mouffe’ agonistic pluralism, especially its ignorance of the impor-
tance of procedures that would help institutionalize and thus protect this pluralism
(Benhabib, 1996). The lack of recognition of socioeconomic inequalities in the
Third World countries as well as the weight of state bureaucracy and technocratic
authoritarianism remain serious limitations to applying Mouffe’ theory to non-
Western contexts (Kapoor, 2002: 479–480).
Beyond ‘Red Lines’: Reporting on the military
The rule of the SCAF, the military interim body, formed after Mubarak’s depar-
ture in 2011, witnessed abhorrent violations of human rights, such as frequent
violent crackdown on civilian protests, military trials of activists and the
so-called ‘virginity test’ – a widespread abuse used against female activists, and
torture in prisons – (Iskandar, 2012). However, this phase witnessed the growth of
Egyptian journalists’ agency as they became bolder in approaching strict red lines,
without breaking from the culture of fear that surrounded dealings with the
military institution. Most of journalists interviewed, from state and private
media alike, described taking a cautious attitude in dealing with the military coun-
cil while reflecting on tools and tricks they employed to escape such pressure.
An example is the experience of a former deputy editor in chief of the official
news agency (MENA), stressing that the publication of information on dissenting
movements witnessed a significant rise in this phase, despite journalists’ fear of
the military:
Before, we used to ignore any news related to the demonstrations of civil movements.
After the fall of the regime, we witnessed an unprecedented level of publishing news
covering all street expressions. The relative red line was SCAF as we were reluctant to
openly criticise the military council. But this was not as sacred as it used to be under
Mubarak’s regime. (March 2013, personal interview)
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In the meantime, the military generals deployed a PR campaign to seduce media by
organizing regular briefs for senior journalists in an attempt to pre-empt any
possible critical reporting using a carrot-and-stick policy. [AQ4] The description
of these meetings by a prominent talk show host demonstrates the extent to which
these meetings were able to influence journalists’ perceptions:
SCAF invited some influential presenters and press editors. They met every one of us
alone, they briefed us on on-going events. The aim was to provide us with accurate
information so when we address our audiences we don’t mess up and we avoid
rumours on the military. I could understand the real role of secret services, the
nature of their work and to what extent they are involved in everything. (March
2013, personal interview)
Despite the unprecedented openness in tackling various topics that used to be
considered ‘sensitive’, airing criticism against the army remained a strict taboo,
for fear of retaliation but also due to entrenched habits of ‘respect’ to the military
institution that enjoys high levels of popularity among Egyptians. However,
the revolutionary euphoria following Mubarak’s departure facilitated an informal
cultural change within newsrooms, including in reporting on the military’s abuses,
especially when these abuses are widespread and reported in international media.
Moreover, the ‘revolt’ against the culture of red lines revealed an important gen-
erational divide between older and younger journalists, the latter eager to challenge
the tendency to avoid sensitive topics that used to guide the editorial decision-
making. This resistance reached even state-owned media. The experience of a
junior reporter at the state-owned Nile TV is instructive. He describes the coverage
by Nile TV of major violent clashes between demonstrators and security forces in
November 2011 in which the state TV reporter dared to expose the brutality of the
security forces, an unprecedented move for the state TV:
Our correspondent was not relying on the news provided by the official news agency
as we used to do. He was in the street, when the police issued a communiqu!e saying
that they did not use gunfire, our correspondent was reporting live showing the empty
cartridge in streets. We were telling what we saw and not what we were told to say.
(June 2012, personal interview)
Another example comes from the experience of a junior reporter for the Ashourouq
independent newspaper covering a press conference in which female activists
denounced being subjected to so called ‘virginity tests’ in a controversial case
that arose under SCAF’s rule. The fear of retaliation did not stop her from cov-
ering a polemic topic and fighting for the publication of her report. She recounts:
I attended a press conference during which women talked about a virginity test they
were forced to take. I wrote an article but my piece was not published the next day.
Nothing was published also in all newspapers. When I asked my editor for the reason
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behind not publishing my piece, I was told that people will not believe that the mil-
itary police can do something like this. (March 2013, personal interview)
The testimony of this young journalist demonstrates informal connivance among
editors to self-censor all topics that could be considered disrespectful to the mili-
tary, to the extent of imposing a blackout on information. However, the abuse of
female activists at the hands of the army became a subject of discussion on main-
stream media, including national Egyptian media.
The informal change in newsrooms’ culture led to unprecedented levels of pub-
lishing information traditionally labelled as ‘sensitive’ or ‘unapproachable’ by
Egyptian journalists, including the elite journalists, those ‘controllers’ who exercise
an editorial decision making on what is deemed to be publishable. Journalists’
timidity decreased with the expansion of abuses under SCAF’s rule and the
coming forward of a few victims who dared to talk to international and regional
media (Shafy, 2011). This courage was boosted by an environment of ‘hypermedia’
(Kraidy, 2007) allowed by the informal fall of taboos; the interconnectedness
of new and old media platforms allowed news stories to be widely shared, thus
galvanizing the growing competition among journalists (and their media) to pub-
lish exclusive information. However, far from garnering institutional support, this
change was limited in scope and volatile at its best. It did not manage to challenge
the ideals of ‘responsible journalism’ for Egyptian journalists in reporting on the
sacred, including the military institution presented in the dominant media narra-
tives as ‘the saviour of the revolution’, the one who stood with the ‘People’ against
the dictator (Mubarak). A former editor-in-chief of a state-owned newspaper, who
claims he played a role in the military’s decision not to attack demonstrators
during the January 2011 uprising, recounts, while showing me the inflammatory
headlines in support of the army, the paper published in that period:
When the demonstrations became a reality in the streets of Cairo, I called my con-
nections – in the military – and told them: you have to choose between siding with the
people or siding with the Mubarak family. I told them this is our opportunity to get
rid of them. (June 2012, personal interview)
The wave of boldness against red lines regressed when the identity of the journalist
as the regime’s guard resurfaced, strongly driven by the perceived ‘dangers’ against
the State and the patriotic duty to support the army against ‘enemies’ including the
revolutionaries.
State media as a battlefield: ‘Brotherhoodization’ of media
The election of a Brotherhood government in June 2012 in the first democratic
elections in the history of the country reshaped the political and media landscape
while unleashing a fierce struggle between the new rulers and the apparatus of civil
servants loyal to the former regime – called the ‘deep state’ – and which remained
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resilient to change (Momani, 2013). The extraordinary and complex battle between
the two camps took media platforms, state and private, as its main stage, demon-
strating the central role of national media as a political institution. A major epi-
sode of this battle was the alleged quest of the Muslim Brotherhood’s newly
appointed government to control state media in order to use it for friendly mes-
saging, in line with former practices, popularly known as the Brotherhoodization
of the media (akhwanat al i
ƒ
lam). This alleged control attempt became a major
topic of debate on the future of state media as well as an opportunity to denigrate
the new government (Ahram Online, 2012). It allowed journalists to display an
active agency through organizing frequent rallies and sit-ins to protest the alleged
attempt by the new government to hijack their newfound liberty. It was also an
opportunity to challenge outdated structures through calling for a true public
service media, a goal quite often translated in journalists’ narratives as
‘the media of the people’.
My research with journalists and managers with the state broadcaster demon-
strates attempts by the new administration to discipline journalists using a mixture
of sanctions and co-optation tools, challenged by unprecedented agency from
journalists to resist this pressure. The attempts to rebel against the new order by
journalists and staff were met by a set of sanctions implemented by the manage-
ment, ranging from referral to Public Prosecution and administrative investiga-
tions to arbitrary salary deductions, suspension from work, prohibition of access
to the workplace, cessation of a program or change of its identity (Rashwan, 2011).
[AQ5] Journalists interviewed talked about a trend of lowering the tone of criti-
cism in state media by limiting the representation of radical and critical voices.
Alleged blacklists for personas non-grata were applied by journalists in their
choices of programme guests, an initiative confirmed by the then-head of the
news department:
If a guest is employing obscene expressions and using our platform to settle personal
accounts, he cannot be a regular guest with us. I asked the staff to invite the wise
people and the moderate voices; those who have constructive opinions that unite and
not divide. (March 2013, personal interview)
However, journalists displayed unprecedented resistance to the attempt to control
their practices, in various manners. An example is given by an editor in the state
TV news department:
I interviewed by phone a revolutionary leader known to be vocal against the Muslim
Brotherhood. The director of programmes was angry and asked me to choose a softer
voice. I asked him to provide me with a list of unwanted guests. He will never put it on
paper. (March 2013, personal interview).
State media under the Brotherhood’s rule witnessed journalists notably resisting
the higher management’s editorial dictate. Journalistic agency was empowered by
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the importance given to state media reform as a major topic in the political reforms
(Elshhati, 2012). However, this agency adopted an interventionist watchdog
model, embedding the personalized and emotional style of bloggers. For instance,
news anchor and former presidential candidate Bothina Kamel faced disciplinary
action after she asked the state TV audience to ‘stay tuned for the Muslim
Brotherhood Bulletin’ while reading the news, an indirect criticism of the news
agenda led by stories on the government’s activities (Maher, 2013).
Asked about this wave of intimidation, the then Minister of Information in the
Brotherhood government Salam Abdel Makssoud argued:
In any media system, journalists and staff can be subject to investigation when they
commit professional mistakes. A presenter for example praised a guest while he was
expressing insults. This is not professional. Will this be accepted in western media?
(Personal interview, March 2013)
While this journalistic agency took bold forms, it is questionable to frame the
resistance expressed by state media journalists to the Brotherhood’s control as
an indicator of a genuine departure from the entrenched practices of serving the
powers in place. The journalistic resistance to the then-new rulers, the Islamists,
who were framed as the ‘enemy from within’ by the state media for decades, can be
seen as an expression of journalists’ loyalty to old elites against new comers whose
legitimacy has been historically denied.
As slogans of change were replaced by those of stability after the military coup,
journalists reverted to old habits of supporting the regime by silencing dissent.
After the overthrow of the Brotherhood, journalists adapted again to editorial
‘orders’ in the name of ‘exceptional’ conditions and the need to support the
state against terrorists. The testimony of a journalist in the state television exem-
plifies the strong return of their identity as guard of the regime:
After the announcement of the removal of Morsi, we celebrated the news, dancing on
desks. We were happy to get rid of the Brotherhood. The pressure became stronger on
what is allowed to say but we live with it and understand the need of applying such
measures as the State is facing terrorism. (November 2013, personal interview)
The new watchdog of politics
The hybridity of practices in Egyptian journalism finds its roots stretching back
long before the 2011 uprising (el Issawi, 2016; Sakr, 2012); journalists adapting to
obedience to red lines in certain topics while challenging them in others. [AQ6] The
journalistic boldness to red lines witnessed phases of expansion and retreat,
according to the changes in the political sphere and the level of tolerance towards
dissent allowed by this change.
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The new media watchdog of politics that flourished in this special parenthesis
took the form of an adversarial critic turning media narratives into a cacophony of
voices, in line with international experiences of media and political transitions (see
Voltmer, 2013). Traditional journalists, including those in state media, expressed
their subjectivity by identifying with political agendas while continually swinging
between two conflicting models: the lapdog journalist with ideological friends and
the attack dog journalist with ideological and political enemies. This nascent cha-
otic new watchdog status empowered journalists’ self-perception as full players in
the power struggle while also increasing the on-going political and societal polar-
ization between supporters of the Brotherhood government and supporters of a
civilian government, including those loyal to the former regime. Polarized media
pluralism took fierce forms, including what the director of the now-extinct Misr 25
TV pro-Brotherhood station calls ‘professional bias’:
There is nothing called neutrality. This is a lie. There is a professional bias. In the
second round of the presidential elections, I was biased to the candidate of the rev-
olution (Morsi), in the name of patriotism. (June 2012, personal interview).
At the other side of the political spectrum, the editor-in-chief of Al-Watan newspa-
per, presumably close to the military institution and known for its staunch opposi-
tion of the Brotherhood, sees neutrality as a non-realistic choice. He comments:
This is a battle we did not choose. We were portrayed as evils: The spiritual leader of
the Brotherhood called us the media of shame, the newspaper’s offices were burned. . .
(June 2012, personal interview)
Beyond the battle of views, smear campaigns raged based on rumours and unfound-
ed accusations, especially the publication of ‘confidential’ documents that were never
verified or investigated by journalists. So-called leaked documents, such as suspi-
cious bank accounts for senior figures in the Brotherhood leadership or evidence of
tax evasion for business projects owned by them were extensively debated across
media platforms. The publication of these documents was amplified, re-published by
news websites, the press and social media pages, as well as debated on talk show
platforms, making them a powerful political tool for manipulation. A climate of
mistrust and fear was looming, aggravating the public’s suspicion towards the
Brotherhood government, laying the groundwork for its demise.
The increasing use of unverified leaked information aggravated the confusion
among journalists and their publics on what is news and what is rumour, as
expressed by the then head of news services at CBC network, a prominent private
televised network that was launched after the 2011 uprising:
The worst enemy of news is rumours. Most of the information we got from the
government or the presidency is a denial of non-confirmed information reported by
media. If we asked about official information to elucidate the story, we have no
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answer. We have to always deal with unfinished stories. (March 2013, personal
interview)
The polarized media pluralism and its normalization in journalists’ practices exac-
erbated the transition’s uncertainty, preparing the terrain for the closure of the
media landscape by empowering a popular perception of media freedom as a
threat to the state’s stability.
Discussions/conclusions
The Egyptian case study is an example of how media polarization impacted
political polarization while being driven by it. The fragmented and chaotic
media landscape that prevailed during this unique parenthesis of openness in the
country’s history was reflective of the society’s fractures and divisions ignited by
the shackles of former disciplines and loyalties. This short phase presented an
invaluable opportunity for Egyptian journalists to develop active agency indepen-
dent from politics. However, this sense of liberation was lived by journalists
through fully engaging in the fierce power struggle between old and new elites,
leading to a replication of the deep-rooted media dependency to politics. Far from
acting as an independent actor, traditional media was deeply invested in the strug-
gles of a wider system of interests and influences, while acting as a producer of
meaning and narratives in this battle.
The experiences of journalists described in this article reflect a blend of political
and business parallelism whereby journalists understand their bias as an expression
of their loyalty to a ‘mission’, that of defining the new identity of the regime, saving
the revolution or saving the state. Their alignment with political agendas was
celebrated as a sign of their empowerment, a sort of ‘awakening’ that allowed
them to nurture complex relations with political powers, this time on an equal
footing, real or imagined. This bias allowed them to reclaim their role as citizens –
not independent from political polarization or neutral towards it in line with the
notion of ‘responsible journalism’: defending the state against its enemies. This
quest for a more confrontational relationship to political power was short lived; it
did not lead to the formation of an independent identity, as this quest did not enjoy
support from the new regime and the journalistic community alike. In line with
Tumber’s analysis on the lack of a sense of independent professional community,
Egyptian journalists claimed their independence by a deeper dependency to polit-
ical agendas. Eager to keep their privileges and further nurture them, their paral-
lelism is a blend of political leaning and clientelist interest.
Egyptian journalists demonstrated an active agency for change in the immediate
phase after the January 2011 uprising through intentionality and purpose.
However, their experiences show the limits of such agency, situated within a com-
plex system of interdependencies. The instrumentalization of the news media by
the state, media owners and political agendas was not challenged in a systematic
manner; the transition neither witnessed any serious attempt to review the
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regulatory structures that dominate the media sector, nor did it allow for a depar-
ture from the ownership model of the wealthy businessman investing in media to
secure a political say and accumulate economic power. The recent move by the
military intelligence to own media organizations directly without the help of
middle men, the business tycoons, has consolidated the state control over media.
Media are not by nature democratic institutions or institutions of democratiza-
tion. The description of the journalist as ‘a walking paradox’ (Nordenstreng, 1995)
reflects the ambiguity surrounding defining the role of a journalist. This confusion
is even greater in contexts where a struggle between old habits and new trends is
not able to be resolved. The data from the fieldwork presented in this article
confirm the negative effect an ambivalent journalistic agency can have on a volatile
change process. For media to act as an institution for change, there is a need for
professional routines and institutional practices that forge the identity of a watch-
dog of power. This role cannot take shape without a review of structures, especially
the dubious relationships between media ownership and the powers in place.
The short-lived revolts enjoyed by Egyptian traditional journalists interviewed in
this study, in their quest to redefine their practices, failed in bringing about lasting
and meaningful change: they did not enjoy support from the new/old political elites
but were rather cleverly manipulated to frame the period following the uprisings in
ways suitable to their agendas. Instead of using this agency in order to further
autonomy from the power by putting the foundations for an independent commu-
nity of professionals, these ‘romantic’ revolts that strived for independence from the
‘big brother’, the regime’s main control bodies, ended by consolidating the power of
parochial agendas over media, exacerbating the journalistic dependency to politics
and the networks of interests. In line with Wolfsfeld’s paradigm of political contest,
politics has gained even more sway on media, as a result of these ‘revolts’.
The dynamic media space post uprising mirrored the unparalleled openness in
the political sphere but was also shaped by political realities. To this, we can add
the realities of inherited structures and their limitations for both politics and media
and the imbalance of force between these structures, and the agentic power exer-
cised by journalists. These structures witnessed a phase of instability after the
uprising without leading to a meaningful reform. It is also important to stress
that the transition to a new democratic rule in Egypt was extremely turbulent.
The military coup in 2013 has stalled the process of democratization; the failure of
the institution-building process aggravated the vulnerability of journalists in resist-
ing the sway of social and political forces, including the hegemonic control of the
military over media and the economy in general. The recent so called constitutional
amendment giving the military full sway over politics and the judiciary make the
margin of manoeuvre for genuine change almost impossible.
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